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NONSITE

Farago’s Global Art History
EDITORIALS ISSUE #25
BY CHARLES PALERMO
OCTOBER 1, 2018

Anyone who’s been paying attention for the past two decades has
noticed that art history (just like the other humanities) has been
furiously globalizing itself. From fighting Eurocentrism to tracing
global networks of exchange, to acknowledging the
incommensurability of multiple modernities, to challenging the
category of art itself as an ideological mystification developed in
modern Europe—which continues to reproduce power structures
and to project them onto other cultures and peoples—turning
global is a move with a lot of sponsorship, both intellectual and
institutional. These different attacks on an art history variously
understood as blinkered, racist or Eurocentric have been canonized
by art historians and, more importantly, by university
administrations. Which is a good thing in lots of ways. Departments
are adding full-time positions in areas they had previously left
untaught or had relied on adjuncts or other non-tenure-eligible
faculty to teach.
But there’s another side to this. Globalizing art history also
subserves varieties of identity politics that are key tools of
neoliberalism. Historically, so-called non-Western art has been
underserved in art history departments—or, what is worse,
misrepresented. Globalizing art history seeks to redress that
inequity. But such efforts at justice can take different forms and
serve different ends. The aim of addressing historical inequalities
typically takes as its goal a redistribution of wealth or representation
that undoes historical inequalities. But, in the case of calls to
address disparities in the distribution of wealth among the
members of various groups without changing the way the economy
works—the demand for reparations as compensation for slavery
and other historical abuses suffered by African Americans, for
instance—, such calls aim to make the operations of the market
fairer in pointed contrast to ending exploitation or creating a
distribution of wealth that is not determined by a market.1 In the
case of calls to address disparities of representation, even less is



accomplished—not even disparities of wealth are on the table. In
either case, what’s at stake is at best making neoliberalism fairer. At
worst, the aim is just to make its cultural production look more
diverse. Either way, the effect is to justify neoliberalism’s
depredations rather than to eliminate them. The neoliberal party
within the university, and within art history specifically, is committed
to this disparitarian politics.2 There’s a reason why social justice is a
paramount consideration in the appointment of your next named
chair, while it is uncouth to mention social justice apropos of
adjuncts or custodial contractors. The preferred species of social
justice plays a real role in disappearing the other. And globalizing is
a version of this maneuver.
So, what does the globalizing approach look like, and how does it
work?
In a recent essay on art history as a taught subject,
Claire Farago identifies “two urgent questions facing the humanities
today”: One is the “increasingly corporate university’s administrative
charge to offer majors that have occupational value” (115).3 Art
history pays its way, occupational-value-wise, because of “the
museum and related institutions and practices, chiefly the
infotainment industry” (115). Farago cites the introduction she wrote
with Donald Preziosi to a volume of essays, in which they argued
that museums play a special role in “the fabrication and
perpetuation of our conception of ourselves as autonomous
individuals with unique subjectivities” (127-28n2). The museum
holds a special place among society’s “ideological apparatuses”
(128n2). So, on Farago’s view, as art historians, we’re reproducing
ourselves as labor for the corporate university and museuminfotainment-complex, in order to support an ideological state
apparatus that holds a special place in producing subjects
(following Althusser, agents with the freedom to make choices and
also a sense of their own subjection to the state4). The first of the
imperatives Farago names indicates that it is not her purpose to
resist the system that reproduces its workers in new subjects. “What
matters crucially are the values that we instill along with the subject
matter” (115). Hence the other urgent imperative: we “need to rethink
how we teach at the introductory level” (115). Althusser praises
certain brave and clear-eyed teachers for bucking their role in
producing subjects for capitalism; Farago, on the other hand, wants
us to produce subjects with good values (“Ideology,” 252). In our
view, her plan is well suited to do precisely that—to produce
subjects for capitalism who are fully trained by the relevant ISA to
savor the ethical weight of the choices they can feel themselves
making when they think about other peoples. This is the politics of



representation at work. The reference to Althusser just makes its
complicity with capitalism rise to visibility.
Is this just Farago’s peculiar self-incriminating mention of Althusser?
What Farago has done by treating art history as an ISA and by
indicating that globalizing it is a feature, not a bug, of the art history
ISA’s program is to offer a surprisingly apt diagnosis of the whole
impulse to globalizing art history. So let’s look further and consider
the political function of global art history, taking Farago’s generally
reliable and compact diagnosis of it as our guide.
To make a concise story short, a few issues
underlie Farago’s account. First, “the history of art has no a

priori object domain” (120). That is to say, it’s not clear which
objects are our business and what narratives will emerge from the
choice of objects we make. The category of art and the categories
that support our organization of its history (“nation-states,
continents, religions, period styles, and other such monolithic
entities” [121]) are neither innocent nor adequate. Secondly, history,
which we understand to be “a dynamic process that flows inbetween, outside, intersects with, and otherwise does not conform
to our inherited subdisciplinary categories,” requires a rethinking of
those categories (120). Finally, as a corollary of the first two, “truth”
must be understood “as something to be negotiated, to be debated,
something that remains relative and particular, rather than fixed and
universal” (120-21), something “tied to concrete situations and
subject positions” (121).
The first issue implies something as simple as overthrowing “our
inherited nineteenth-century categories” (124)—such as “Art”—and
teaching “all forms of cultural production,” including “song and
dance, poetry, music, storytelling” (122). This turn to cultural studies
is, in a certain sense, old news. We all range freely over fields of
cultural production and practice. If the twentieth century taught us
anything it is that, ontologically, art status is cheap. Anyone can
secure it for nearly any artifact or practice, including “song and
dance, poetry, music, storytelling”; indeed, art is a part of ordinary
life and has been for a long time. Of course, there are significant
achievements in the various arts, which one may celebrate with
praise and study. In order to make art sinister, we have to transform
it. Then we call it fine art. Such art is made by geniuses,
commissioned by kings, discussed by an exclusive cadre of
specialists, and is by its nature ideologically saturated with notions
of genius, political hierarchy, and Eurocentrism, according to a
certain well worn line of reasoning, so we call it “fine art” or just “Art.”
But that’s not where the real force of Farago’s argument lies, and
that sleight of hand is another topic. To see the real thrust of



problematizing the category of art (Art), we have to see how it
articulates with the other issues she raises.
So, unsurprisingly, something similar occurs with the second issue:
“Considering the global trading network established in the sixteenth
century in a longer historical context effectively decenters the
dominant role attributed to Europe in the era of colonialism” (124).
The early modern world’s story is not the story of Europe, so
discourse should “embrace[] the challenge to theorize about the
complexities of cultural interaction without imposing ethnocentric
categories such as those that historically define the discipline on
Euro-American terms” (122). Again, there is nothing shocking here;
furthermore, nothing incompatible with the practice of art history as
we all know it. One can imagine an art historian working on artifacts
outside modern European discourse wanting to use concepts and
categories the makers of those artifacts used. One of the good
results of the recent move toward global art history is an increase in
the number of such specialists and commensurate progress in
those fields of study. Will the department’s specialist in early
modern Europe really insist, against protests of their irrelevance,
that the new specialist in South Asian art produce a set of stylistic
categories supported by periodizations and national schools?
But to see it that way would be to miss the point again. Farago is
clear up front: what we do is political. That, of course, has been the
premise of this discussion of Farago’s essay. But how
does Farago understand her politics? According to Farago, citing
Giorgio Agamben, politics “will no longer be a struggle for the
conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State
and the non-State (humanity).”5 Agamben is pointing to Tiananmen
Square—an infamous clash between protesters and the state, in
which, according to Agamben, the protesters distinguished their
protest by “the relative absence of determinate contents in their
demands” (“Tiananmen,” 68). Agamben takes this to be the new
mode of politics, which will oppose itself to the state—the power of
individuals to “form a community without affirming an identity”
(“Tiananmen,” 87). This might explain why our role in this struggle is
to overcome and to alert our students to the visual rhetorical
strategies that allowed Donald Trump to mislead and deceive the
American public, to make them complicit in his program of racist
xenophobia (118). This belonging without identity would oppose
racism and xenophobia, which pit members of one identity against
members of another. And this seems to be a welcome alternative to
multiculturalism, which opposes racism and xenophobia and their
hypostatization of ethnicity as fundamentally mistaken only to
respond with a demand that ethnicity be hypostatized more
affirmatively. By eschewing identity in favor of belonging as



such, Agamben (and Farago) transcend identity politics by replacing
identities with subjects.
This approach retains the salutary antiracism of traditional identity
politics while continuing to neglect class politics. A protest without
demands is not a protest against capitalism. Farago’s proposal, then,
is to recognize (correctly) the racist and xenophobic dimensions
of Trumpism (and of right-wing politics of the recent past), but to
implicitly ignore the equally (or more) central place of its neoliberal
economic policies. This is, like the “relative absence of determinate
contents” that marked the demands of the Tiananmen protestors, a
politics without political objectives. In a world wracked by the
depredations of capitalism, is a “relative absence of determinate
contents” the right model for our political agenda? No.
Again: is this Farago’s politics, or is this something in the DNA of
global art history? Insofar as globalization concerns itself with
“subject positions,” it seems clear that struggles for state power and
deep changes to the relations of production and the exploitation of
labor are not just beyond its grasp but irrelevant to it. How is this
antipathy to class politics inherent in Farago’s approach?
The key move here is Farago’s shift from truth as “fixed and
universal” toward a notion of truth as based on “subject positions”
(121). Accordingly, “the same object or concrete manifestation can
have multiple meanings for its users,” a point Farago takes to be
“timely” precisely because awareness that “works of art and other
cultural artifacts that art historians study are irreducibly multivalent
[…] can enable individuals with different beliefs to coexist in the
same heterogeneous society” (125). Objects mean different things,
according to Farago, to different people. Learning that cultural
artifacts mean what their various users take them to mean is
inherent in Farago’s politics, according to which heterogeneous
humanity organizes itself around its heterogeneity and does so in
pointed disregard for the variety of its unreconciled “different
beliefs.”
This move is familiar. And not just because Trump and people like
him insist that other people (whatever that means) are irreducibly
different from us (whatever that means). Even when a right-thinking
liberal like Farago does it, replacing meaning with identity and
disagreement with difference is a profoundly ideological tendency
and one that is fundamental to recent history’s nearly invisible
acquiescence to neoliberalism. Since the fall of the Soviet Union,
the notion that we have no universal issues (history) to debate, but
have instead separate experiences (histories) to recognize, has



meant the displacement of objective issues such as exploitation by
subjective concerns like recognition.
So this is how Farago’s argument works. And this is the inevitable
logic of globalization as a cause in the humanities. The status of the
work of art is called into question. This takes a particular form.
Rather than recognizing the ontological generosity of the category
of art, the argument demands a critique of the category as such.
With that questioning comes a critique of the very notion of
categories as a universalist legacy of European domination; rather
than turn to a historicism that multiplies contexts, discourses, and
therefore categories, the argument requires that meaning be
relativized, freed from contexts, discourses, and categories
altogether. This entails a suspension of truth claims, so that subject
position displaces meaning (not what something means to me, or
means to someone), and difference trumps disagreement. So we
arrive at a politics of subject positions as against a politics of class.
We stand before the state’s tanks without an analysis of history or of
exploitation; without solidarity grounded in demands. Who could
ask for a better subject?
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